Constructive Memory for Bizarre and Sensible Sentences by Hertel, Paula T & Ellis, H. C
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Psychology Faculty Research Psychology Department 
1979 
Constructive Memory for Bizarre and Sensible Sentences 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University, phertel@trinity.edu 
H. C. Ellis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/psych_faculty 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Publication Details 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 
Repository Citation 
Hertel, P.T., & Ellis, H.C. (1979). Constructive memory for bizarre and sensible sentences. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 5(4), 386-394. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.5.4.386 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital Commons @ 
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Learning and Memory 
1979, Vol. 5, No. 4, 386-394 
Constructive Memory for Bizarre and Sensible Sentences 
Paula T. Hertel and Henry C. Ellis 
University of New Mexico 
S ensible, interrelated sentences were presented with or without bizarre s-en­
tences that could be transformed to fit the context of the sensible sentences. 
Two experiments examined subjec-ts' ability to recognize or recall both types 
of sentences, either immediately -or after 2 weeks. Bizarre sentences were 
frequently recognized at immediate testing; they were generally unavailable 
at delayed recognition and were never recalled verbatim. In addition, results 
indicated that transformations of bizarre sentences were stored in memory 
but were not well incorporated within the structure for the sensible material. 
These findings are consistent with a constructive approach to memory. 
Finally, the results suggest that processing bizarre information can lead to 
more accurate recognition and recall of the sensible context. 
The constructive approach to memory has 
emphasized that memory for an event can 
change qualitatively over the course of time. 
The approach has its roots in Bartlett's 
( 1932) memory investigations in which sub­
jects read folktales from unfamiliar cultures 
and reproduced them repeatedly over vary­
ing intervals of time ( cf. Cofer, 1976) . 
Bartlett drew two major conclusions con­
cerning the processess affecting the observed 
memory changes : (a) Recall was recon­
structed from schemata or representations 
of meaningful information that had been ab­
stracted during the processing of the folk­
tales and (b) subjects processed unusual 
portions of the folktales in an "effort after 
meaning," in an attempt to make the ma­
terial more understandable and, therefore, 
easier to integrate into the overall meaning 
structure. 
This research was supported by National Insti­
tute of Mental Health Grant MH-15142 to the 
second author. 
We wish to thank Elizabeth Loftus and Charles 
Cofer for their thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft and John Schnizlein for helpful advice and 
the formulation of the conversion algorithm for 
A', based on Pollack and Norman (1964). 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Henry C. 
Ellis, Department of Psychology, University of 
New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131. 
Evidence for Bartlett's first conclusion, re­
construction from abstract representations, 
has been supplied by several closely related 
lines of research. The nature of what is 
remembered about meaningful material can 
be located on a continuum from verbatim to 
thematic information. For example, both 
recognition and recall errors in memory for 
sentence surface structure occur more fre­
quently than meaning errors (Jarvella, 1971 ; 
Sachs, 1967) . In addition, the meaning of 
individual sentences is forgotten more rap­
idly than paragraph gist or ideas expressed 
by more than one sentence (Bransford & 
Franks, 1972 ; Dooling, Christiaansen, & 
Keenan, Note 1) . However, the tendency 
to rely on abstract information rather than 
verbatim information is partly determined 
by the type of material to be learned (Brans­
ford & Franks, 1972) and by task demands 
(Graesser & Mandler, 1975) . 
Additional evidence that memory is recon­
structed from holistic representations has 
emanated from experiments in inferential 
reasoning and context manipulations. The 
major thrust of these experiments is that 
extra experimental knowledge (Bransford, 
Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Sulin & Dooling, 
197 4) or related experimental materials 
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Loftus, 1975; 
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Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) contribute to 
changes in memorial performance. 
The great majority of research in this 
area has emphasized the constructive pro­
cessing of sensible material. In contrast, 
little support has been found for Bartlett's 
( 1932) conclusion that bizarre information 
is omitted or transformed to make it more 
comprehensible. Although Bartlett did find 
that subjects frequently omitted portions 
that were difficult to understand, he did not 
report data concerning immediate memory 
for the bizarre portions. In addition, the use 
of a reproductive memory task may have 
biased subjects to write well-integrated, sen­
sible stories, explaining or omitting unusual 
elements that may have been remembered. 
Finally, repeated attempts to recall involve 
the obvious problem of memory for the re­
sults of earlier efforts. 
The following experiments were designed 
to test Bartlett's ( 1932) conclusions con­
cerning memory for the bizarre. Bizarre sen­
tences were constructed by violating rules 
of language usage, specifically by having in­
animate objects perform actions of which 
they are incapable ; an example is "The hot 
dogs prepared the woman." The bizarre sen­
tences were presented along with sensible 
sentences that provided a context for possible 
transformations of the bizarre. For example, 
hearing that it was dinner time, the woman 
was dutiful, hot dogs were steaming, and 
children were hungry establishes a context 
for transforming the bizarre information into 
the idea that the woman prepared the hot 
dogs. A constructive approach to memory 
predicts that bizarre information should be, 
for the most part, forgotten at delayed testing 
due to the difficulty of constructing accurate 
semantic representations or to the difficulty 
of combining verbatim representations of the 
bizarre and the sensible material into a mean­
ingful whole. In addition, strong evidence for 
integrated memory would be provided by the 
transformation of the bizarre elements into 
sensible information more consonant with 
the interrelated context. The latter possi­
bility is the phenomenon referred to by 
Bartlett as ·effort after meaning. Finally, we 
expected to find that the sensible context was 
stored in an integrated fashion. In summary, 
these experiments focus on two principal 
issues : (a) the temporal course of memory 
for bizarre information and (b) the effect 
of the bizarre information on memory for the 
sensible context. 
Experiment 1 
The first experiment employed a modifica­
tion of Bransford and Frank's ( 1972) para­
digm for demonstrating integrated memory. 
This paradigm was chosen because it in­
volves the presentation of single sentences. 
Presenting single sentences should decrease 
the bias against responding to strange ele­
ments, which may exist with prose material. 
In addition, the single sentences are solely 
recombinations of simple ideas contained in 
one complex idea. Bransford and Franks 
have shown that subjects construct the com­
plex idea (which is never presented during 
acquisition) as the most ·efficient means of 
encoding the experimental material. There­
fore, in this experiment, the sensible material, 
presented as a list of such sentences, should 
be stored in a unified fashion and should 
provide an appropriate context for trans­
forming the bizzare. 
The procedure consisted of an acquisi­
tion phase, during which subjects wrote 
each sentence after hearing it, and a recog­
nition phase, during which subjects at­
tempted to detect previously presented sen­
tences out of a list of old sentences combined 
with several types of distractors, including 
transformations of the bizarre. The acqui­
sition list either included the bizarre sen­
tences (bizarre condition) or did not (con­
trol condition) , and recognition testing oc­
curred either immediately or after a 2-wk. 
delay. 
Recognition of bizarre sentences was ex­
pected to be excellent at immediate testing, 
demonstrating a lack of bias against process­
ing the unusual. Second, given a high level 
of immediate recognition, bizarre informa­
tion was expected to be unavailable at de­
layed testing. In addition, bizarre-acquisition 
subjects were predicted to be poorer than 
control-acquisition subjects at rejecting 
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transformations of the bizarre, compared to 
nontransformational distractors. 
Method 
Subjects. Forty-eight volunteers from introduc­
tory psychology classes at the University of New 
Mexico served as subjects ( 12 in each condition) and 
received class credit. Groups of 4--8 subjects were 
randomly assigned to acquisition conditions, and sub­
jects within groups were randomly assigned to 
test conditions. 
Materials. Two idea sets, or complex propo­
sitions, were invented and are presented in Table 
1. Each idea set may be broken into six simple 
ideas, and sentences may be constructed that con­
tain from one to four of the simple ideas within 
each idea set. 
For both acquisitions lists, 16 of these sen­
tences were constructed so as not to include the 
main idea of the idea set ("The woman prepared 
hot dogs" and "The grandfather comforted the 
girl"). Constraints of equal frequency of idea set 
and sentence length (from one to four simple 
ideas) were observed. Each simple idea occurred 
an equal number of times and was just as likely 
to occur in a short sentence as in a long one. Ex­
amples of two-idea, sensible acquisition sentences 
are also presented in Table 1. The two acquisition 
lists differed only with respect to the bizarre sen­
tences in Table 1. The bizarre list contained these 
sentences in Positions 5 and 12, whereas the con­
trol list contained two extra one-idea sentences in 
the corresponding positions. The remaining list 
positions were randomly determined, with the re­
striction that sentences from the same idea set did 
Table 1 
not occur consecutively. A total of 18 sentences 
occurred on each list. 
The recognition list contained the two bizarre 
sentences, eight old sensible sentences, and eight 
sentences from each of four distractor types. In all 
cases, the eight sentences were comprised of two 
sentences within each sentence length ( 1-4), one 
of the two from each idea set (except for noncase 
distractors, in which case sentences contained ideas 
from both idea sets) . 
The two-idea sentences for each distractor type 
are presented in Table 1. New distractors were 
constructed just like the sensible-acquisition sen­
tences; however, they were not presented until 
recognition testing. (Similarly constructed sen­
tences were used by Bransford and Franks, 1972, 
to demonstrate loss of memory for exact wording.) 
Transformed sentences all included the main idea 
of the idea set, which was never presented during 
acquisition. Inference sentences all included an 
alternate way of stating the main idea; the verbs 
cooked and helPed were consistently used in place 
of prepared and comforted. These sentences served 
as controls for the possibility. that transformed 
sentences might be responded to solely on the 
basis that they contain logical inferences. Finally, 
noncase sentences contained words or ideas from 
both idea sets and were included as controls for 
semantic accuracy. 
Selection of the 42 sentences was randomized 
for each of four recognition list orders ; idea sets 
alternated. The assignment of list order was coun­
terbalanced within experimental conditions. 
Procedure.  Instructions and materials for the 
acquisition phase were presented on a cassette re­
corder. Subjects were told that they would hear 
a list of sentences and that their task was to 
Acquisition and Recognition Materials for Experiment 1 
Item 
Sensible 
Bizarre 
New 
Transformed 
Inference 
Noncase 
Idea set 
At dinnertime the dutiful woman prepared 
steaming hot dogs for the hungry children. 
The protective grandfather rushed outside 
to comfort the little girl who fell off her 
bike and was crying. 
Acquisition sentences 
At dinnertime the children were hungry. The little girl was crying. 
The hot dogs prepared the woman. The bike comforted the grandfather. 
Recognition distractors 
The steaming hot dogs were for the children. The grandfather was protective and the 
girl fell off her bike. 
At dinnertime the woman prepared hot dogs. The grandfather comforted the girl who fell 
off her bike. 
The woman cooked hot dogs for the children The protective grandfather helped the girl. 
The dutiful woman rushed outside. The girl was little and the children were 
hungry. 
Note. Examples of sensible acquisition sentences and distractors are all two ideas in length, although lengths 
of one to four were employed in the experiment. 
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listen to each sentence, name the color of a card 
held by the experimenter, write the sentence, and 
fold the paper down to cover the sentence. Two 
practice trials were given. Sentence presentation 
rate was controlled by the experimenter to allow 
an interval long enough for all subjects to write 
the sentences ; the interval varied from approxi­
mately 15 to 30 sec. Following the acquisition 
phase, half of the subjects in each group were ran­
domly selected to return in 2 wk. and were not 
told what to expect on return. 
The recognition phase was administered to 
groups of two to four subjects. Response sheets 
were numbered from 1 to 42, with the words YES NO 
next to each number. Subjects were instructed to 
judge whether each recognition sentence had been 
presented previously in the experiment by circling 
the appropriate word. The list was presented on 
tape, with a 5-sec pause between sentences. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses found no reliable in­
teractions with idea set; therefore, the data 
were collapsed across this variable. Table 2 
presents the hit rates or false alarm rates for 
each type of recognition sentence. For analy­
ses concerning memory for bizarre sen­
tences, the hit rates for these sentences were 
compared to those for old sensible sentences. 
Second, to analyze detection differences 
among distractor types, false alarm rates and 
the hit rates for old sentences were converted 
into A' statistics, which are comparable to 
percentage correct in a two-alternative; 
forced-choice task (Green & Swets, 1974, 
Appendix III, 3.3) . Table 3 presents A' cell 
means for each distractor type. A value of 
.5 represents the inability to detect differ­
ences between the distractors and the old 
sensible sentences. 
Table 2 
Memory for the bizarre. The relevant 
data in Table 2 are the proportion of yes re­
sponses to bizarre and old sentences that 
were made by subjects in the bizarre-im­
mediate and bizarre-delay conditions. Clearly, 
the number of positive responses to old sensi­
ble sentences remained at a substantial level 
over the delay interval, whereas those to 
bizarre sentences decreased dramatically, 
F(1, 44) = 23.70, MS.= 4.57, p < .001. 
Although fewer bizarre sentences were pre­
sented on the acquisition list, subjects rec­
ognized them as well as old sentences when 
they were tested immediately, F ( 1, 11 ) = 
.90, MS. = 9.24. 
Transformations of the bizarre. The 
means in Table 3 indicate that rejection of 
transformed sentences decreased over time 
for both acquisition conditions, F ( 1, 44) = 
19.00, MSe = .012, p < .001. In addition, 
control conditions were reliably better than 
bizarre conditions in rejecting the trans­
formed distractors, F(l, 44) = 4.85, MS.= 
.012, p < .033. More importantly, at delayed 
testing the difference between rejection of 
transformed and inference distractors was 
greater for the bizarre condition than for 
the control condition, F(l, 44) = 8.47, MS. 
= .016, p < .006. Therefore, at delayed 
testing, only the responses of subjects hear­
ing bizarre input indicated a memory bias for 
sensible restatements of the bizarre (trans­
formed distractors) , which was greater than 
any tendency to respond to statements im­
plied by the sensible input sentences (in­
ference distractors) . 
Results that were somewhat unexpected 
Proportion of Yes Responses for Each Type of Recognition Sentence 
Condition 
Bizarre Bizarre Control Control 
Sentence type n immediate delay immediate delay 
Bizarre 2 .63 .17 .00 .00 
Old 8 .73 .80 .74 .85 
New 8 .57 .77 .72 .84 
Transformed 8 .29 .61 .14 .62 
Inference 8 .21 .35 .16 .54 
Noncase 8 .00 .11 .01 .16 
Note. n = the number of each type on the recognition list. 
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Table 3 
Mean A' for Each Type of Distractor Sentence in Each Condition 
Condition 
Bizarre Bizarre Control Control 
Distractor type immediate delay immediate delay 
New .64 .52 .53 .50 
Transformed .80 .68 .89 .73 
Inference .83 .81 .87 .71 
Noncase .93 .91 .93 .91 
Note. A' was computed from the hit rate for the eight old sentences, compared to the false-alarm rate for 
the eight sentences from each distractor type. A score of .5 represents the inability to differentiate between 
old sentences and distractors. 
were the relatively low rejection levels for 
transformed and inference distractors by 
control-delay subjects. These results may 
indicate that both types of sentences were 
easily inferred from the acquisition material. 
In general, as memory for detail presum­
ably declined over time, all subjects' re­
sponses increasingly reflected logical in­
ferences. The inferences may have been 
stored at acquisition and easily rejected when 
testing was immediate, due to still excellent 
memory for detail. Or, the inferences may 
have occurred at delayed testing, due to the 
nonavailability of specific input information. 
However, it is clear that subjects in the 
bizarre-acquisition condition differentiated 
possible inferences based on their exposure 
to bizarre sentences. They retained some in­
formation as long as 2 wk following ac­
quisition, which allowed them to respond 
positively to transformed sentences and to 
mostly reject bizarre sentences. This pattern 
of responding may indicate transformational 
encoding. 
New and noncase sentences. All subjects 
were uniformly superior at rejecting non­
case sentences, as in other experiments using 
this paradigm (Bransford & Franks, 1972) . 
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that for most 
conditions, the difference in proportion of 
yes responses between old and new sensible 
sentences was unreliable, replicating Brans­
ford and Franks's findings, except for the 
bizarre-immediate condition. The difference 
in proportion of yes responses was reliably 
greater for this condition than for the con­
trol-immediate condition, F ( 1, 44) = 4.36, 
MS.= 1.62, p < .041. But since the A' data 
(Table 3) did not reflect a reliable difference 
between bizarre-immediate and control-im­
mediate conditions in the rejection of new 
sentences, the interpretation is difficult. A 
plausible interpretation is that the occurrence 
of bizarre sentences inculcated a more con­
servative bias in responding to recognition 
sentences. 
Additional support for an effect of bizarre 
information on context accuracy was pro­
vided by examining sentences written during 
the acquisition task for potential differences 
between acquisition conditions. Sentences 
copied following the occurrence of the first 
bizarre sentence (Position 5) were scored 
for the number of errors in surface struc­
ture that they contained (omissions or ad­
ditions ·of simple ideas, phrase-order rever­
sals, and other order confusions) . Errors 
were twice as frequent in the control condition 
as in the bizarre condition (totals of 21 and 
10, respectively) . A chi-square analysis was 
performed by categorizing the performance 
of each subject according to acquisition con­
dition and the presence or absence of sur­
face-structure error (x2 corrected for con­
tinuity = 5.34, p < .025) . In both conditions, 
very few errors occurred prior to the first 
bizarre sentence, and bizarre sentences were 
copied accurately. 
Experiment 2 
The results from the first experiment dem­
onstrated that omissions and transformations 
of bizarre information were characteristic 
of recognition performance. However, bi-
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zarre-delay subjects could often reject trans­
formed sentences ; for example, there was a 
substantial difference between the delayed 
rejection of these sentences and new sen­
tences. Furthermore, control-delay subjects 
tended to falsely recognize both types of 
inferences. These results indicated that pro­
viding recognition distractors may have con­
strained memory performance. Therefore, a 
cued-recall task was employed in Experi­
ment 2 to allow for the expression of unique 
transformations and to compare levels of in­
ference production across conditions. 
Method 
Subjects. Thirty-one students participated in 
the experiment. The acquisition materials were 
presented to groups of 7-9 subjects, and the size of 
the test groups ranged from 3 to 6. Groups were 
randomly assigned to acquisition conditions, and 
subjects within groups were randomly assigned to 
testing conditions. 
Materials. The acquisition lists were identical 
to those in Experiment 1. All response sheets for 
cued recall followed the format of three key words 
from one idea set typed across the top of the page, 
with nine numbered spaces below. For the idea set 
concerning the woman, cuing words were woman, 
hot dogs, and children, and for the second set, they 
were grandfather, girl, and bike. 
Procedure. The acquisition phase and reten­
tion intervals duplicated Experiment 1. The testing 
phase began with the distribution of response 
sheets, and the following instructions were pre­
sented on tape: 
Your task is to recall the nine sentences you have 
heard in this experiment which contained one or 
more of the words at the top of the page, and 
to write these sentences in the spaces provided. 
Each sentence you write must contain at least 
one of the words you see, and you must write all 
nine. If you have great difficulty remembering 
a sentence, write a close approximation to what 
it might have been. 
Instructions mentioned approximations so that sub­
jects tested at delay would consider the task more 
reasonable. After the 10 min. allowed for first 
recall, the second response sheet was distributed, 
and the instructions were repeated. Order of idea­
set recall was counterbalanced within each testing 
group. 
Results and Discussion 
Scoring. Protocol sentences were exam­
ined for possible classification into one of 
four categories. Sentences were judged as 
belonging to the idea-set category if they 
contained simple ideas or combinations of 
simple ideas within the idea set and did not 
include elaborations ; word substitutions 
were allowed as long as they preserved the 
meaning of the ideas. The inference category 
was employed for sentences stating a rela­
tionship between the subject of the first 
clause and the subject of the second clause 
of each full idea set, such that the subject of 
the first clause acted on the subject of the 
second clause (for example, "The woman 
made hot dogs for the hungry children.") . 
Other intrusions were allowed, and they oc­
curred infrequently. The elaboration cate­
gory was reserved for all sentences contain­
ing information that could not be directly 
inferred from either idea set, such as the no­
tions that the children were playing, the 
grandfather was sitting on the porch, or the 
hot dogs were in the oven. This category was 
not used for sentences containing the infer­
ences discussed previously. Finally, the bi­
zarre category was intended for verbatim 
reproductions of the bizarre sentences, plus 
any sentences judged to be transformations 
of bizarre sentences. 
Other types of sentences were produced ; 
they consisted of noncase sentences as well 
as sentences containing secondary inferences, 
such as "The hot dogs were ready for the 
children." Their number was indirectly de­
termined by the procedural constraint of 
writing exactly nine sentences. More im­
portantly, because the mean number of such 
sentences across conditions was slightly 
greater than one, an analysis of possible dif­
ferences was prevented by the probable floor 
effect. 
To obtain an estimate of the reliability of 
the classification system, a second observer 
scored one protocol from each of four sub­
jects in each condition. The correlation be­
tween the judgments of the two raters was 
.97. Therefore, the classifications made by 
the first observer were employed for all 
analyses. 
Semantic accuracy. The mean number of 
sentences produced in the idea-set, inference, 
and elaboration categories were analyzed for 
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Table 4 
Mean Number of Sentences Produced in Each Condition, According to Sentence Category 
Condition 
Bizarre Bizarre Control Control 
Sentence category immediate delay immediate delay 
Idea set 11.43 
Inference 1.71 
Elaboration .43 
Bizarre 1.00 
differences among the four conditions, using 
the approach to nonorthogonal analysis of 
variance recommended by Appelbaum and 
Cramer ( 197 4) . Since none of the following 
analyses reliably interacted with the idea-set 
variable, the data were collapsed across idea 
sets or protocols. Table 4 contains the mean 
number of idea-set, inference, and elabora­
tion sentences (as well as the mean number 
of bizarre sentences) that were produced in 
each condition. 
The major findings were that subjects in 
both acquisition conditions wrote primarily 
idea-set sentences at immediate recall, 
whereas at delayed testing, the recall of con­
trol subjects not exposed to bizarre material 
was largely comprised of inference and elabo­
ration sentences. The difference between ac­
quisition conditions in immediate production 
of idea-set sentences was not reliable, 
F ( 1, 27) = 2.22, M S e = 9.28, indicating that 
all subjects relied on information in the idea 
sets. Second, at delayed testing, the produc­
tion of idea-set sentences declined for both 
acquisition conditions, but the decline was 
greater for the control condition, as indicated 
by a reliable interaction, F(l, 27) = 6.67, 
MSe = 9.28, p < .016. 
The mean number of inference sentences 
produced by both acquisition conditions 
clearly increased across testing conditions, 
F(l ,  27) = 11.69, MSe = 10.63, p < .002. 
To be certain that these inferences were 
based on memory for the presented material 
and were not artifactual of the frequency 
with which the cuing words might be com­
bined arbitrarily into sentences with similar 
meaning, an additional group of 10 subjects 
was asked to construct 9 probable sentences 
9.00 13.00 4.89 
5.14 1.63 6.11 
1.14 .63 3.44 
.00 .00 .00 
for each set of cuing words. Out of the 180 
sentences, only 7 inference-type sentences 
were produced. An informal comparison of 
the recall data to these production data indi­
cates that inferences were reliably produced 
at delay. 
Although the production of inference sen­
tences did not reliably differ between acqui­
sition conditions at delayed testing, control­
delay subjects wrote significantly more 
elaboration sentences than did bizarre-delay 
subjects, F(l ,  27) = 6.01, MSe = 5.88, 
p < .021. The tendency of bizarre-delay sub­
jects to write more idea-set sentences and 
fewer elaboration sentences than control­
delay subjects probably indicates better mem­
ory for the nature of the acquisition list and/ 
or a greater bias to write sentences that 
conform to it. In either case, hearing un­
usual sentences had a long-lasting effect on 
recall of sensible material. 
Transformations of the bizarre. Four of 
·the seven subjects in the bizarre-immediate 
condition wrote a total of seven sentences 
placed in the bizarre category. One subject 
attempted to preserve the bizarre quality of 
the acquisition sentence : "The bike was pro­
tective to the grandfather." The remaining 
six sentences were clear interpretations. Two 
of these contained the idea that the woman 
prepared hot dogs and occurred on proto­
cols containing no other inferences. This 
type of inference was not written by subjects 
in other conditions. Therefore, these sen­
tences may indicate transformational encod­
ing. Furthermore, the other interpretations 
produced immediately (e.g., "The grand­
father was happy that the bike was not 
hurt") were intuitively good examples of ef-
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fort after meaning. It is certainly possible 
that they were produced due to a bias to 
write sensible sentences, but since the design 
of the experiment logically reduced such a 
production bias, these sentences may at least 
partially indicate encoding efforts. 
Virtually no evidence for transformations 
was produced at delayed testing, even though 
many inferences were written. By comparing 
these results to those of Experiment 1, it 
may be concluded that transformations were 
not sufficiently incorporated with informa­
tion from the idea sets to be readily acces­
sible at delayed testing. This line of reason­
ing also suggests that inference production 
occurred at testing ; an inability to retrieve 
transformations of the bizarre implies a simi­
lar inability to retrieve previously stored 
inferences. 
General Discussion 
The more important results from Experi­
ments I and 2 are relevant to Bartlett's 
(1932) assumption that unusual elements 
within a sensible context are omitted or 
transformed in an effort after meaning. These 
results demonstrate that the availability of 
bizarre information decreased dramatically 
over a 2-wk. period, and bizarre sentences 
were never recalled verbatim. Instead, they 
appear to have been transformed to fit the 
context of the sensible material. Transfor­
mations were produced in an immediate 
recall test, under conditions which should 
have minimized a sensible response bias. 
Furthermore, only the subjects who received 
bizzare input were reliably poorer at reject­
ing transformational distractors than general 
inference distractors at delayed recognition. 
The last finding indicates some transfor­
mational representation of bizarre informa­
tion, in spite of the findings that control­
delay subjects tended to falsely recognize 
both types of inferential distractors and all 
subjects produced an increased number of 
inferences at delayed recall. Since bizarre­
delay subjects did not produce transforma­
tions at delayed recall, these inferences most 
likely resulted from processes operating 
during the memory test. At delayed testing, 
subjects presumably have less specific infor-
mation available (Dooling et al., Note 1) 
and may, therefore, make inferences based 
on the general theme of the sensible material. 
The fact that bizarre-acquisition subjects 
did not use information contained in bizarre 
sentences to express these inferences at 
delayed recall certainly suggests that the 
transformational effect was relatively weak 
and that subjects did not incorporate trans­
formations into their integrated representa­
tions for the sensible context. The nature 
of the acquisition task is possibly responsible 
for this weak effect. Bartlett ( 1932) found 
that unusual information was explained in 
a manner that facilitated comprehension of 
the entire passage, whereas the ideas em­
ployed in these experiments could be easily 
understood and inferences readily made. In 
short, materials of these experiments re­
quired fewer integrative efforts and less 
need to incorporate :transformational at­
tempts, compared to the processing of 
strange folktales. 
Second, the results of both experiments 
suggest that the processing of syntactically 
strange information can improve memorial 
accuracy with regard to the sensible con­
text. Although sensitivity to new distractors 
at immediate testing was not reliably 
superior for subjects who had heard bizarre 
sentences, these subjects made fewer posi­
tive responses to these distractors, compared 
to old sentences, than did control subjects. 
This pattern of results may very well indi­
cate that bizarre information led to a more 
conservative response bias. Alternatively, 
the superior copying performance of bizarre­
acquisition subjects suggests that bizarre 
information affected encoding accuracy. The 
latter possibility, although unsupported by 
the A' data, is consistent with the view that 
the amount of cognitive effort employed to 
process at a particular level can account for 
differences in memory performance (Hertel, 
Tyler, McCallum, & Ellis, Note 2). Either 
the raised response criterion explanation or 
the encoding effort explanation can be in­
voked to account for the superior recall 
accuracy of bizarre-delay subjects. After 
2 wk., their performance demonstrated better 
memory for the nature of the acquisition list 
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and fewer importations of nonimplicated 
details. It therefore appears that hearing 
syntactically unusual sentences leads to more 
cautious encoding and/or retrieval of the 
sensible context. 
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